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Abstract 
 
Modern networked systems are constantly under threat from systemic attacks. There has been a 
massive upsurge in the number of devices connected to a network as well as the associated traffic 
volume. This has intensified the need to better understand all possible attack vectors during 
system design and implementation. Further, it has increased the need to mine large data sets, 
analyzing which has become a daunting task. It is critical to scale monitoring infrastructures to 
match this need, but a difficult goal for the small and medium organization. Hence, there is a 
need to propose novel approaches that address the big data problem in security. Information 
Centrality (IC) labels network nodes with better vantage points for detecting network-based 
anomalies as central nodes and uses them for detecting a category of attacks called systemic 
attacks. The main idea is that since these central nodes already see a lot of information flowing 
through the network, they are in a good position to detect anomalies before other nodes. This 
research first dives into the importance of using graphs in understanding the topology and 
information flow. We then introduce the usage of information centrality, a centrality based index, 
to reduce data collection in existing communication networks. Using IC-identified central nodes 
can accelerate outlier detection when armed with a suitable anomaly detection technique. We also 
come up with a more efficient way to compute Information centrality for large networks. Finally, 
we demonstrate that central nodes detect anomalous behavior much faster than other non-central 
nodes, given the anomalous behavior is systemic in nature. 
 
Introduction 
 
From a cyber security perspective, the year 2017 was challenging for organizations all over the world. 
Businesses of all sizes have been impacted in unprecedented ways. In a survey, Kaspersky labs gathered 
data from over 4000 companies, big and small, across the world about the most crucial metric of incident 
detection and response, which is time. Reportedly, 8.2% were able to detect a security event almost 
instantly, 14.19% within a few hours, and 20.5% within a day of the attack. These numbers indicate a 
growing need for security intelligence for businesses. The deep-rooted cause behind such alarming 
statistics is the rapid deployment of connected devices. IDS are burdened with analyzing massive datasets 
and hence require more time to perform their function. The report is proof of how detection time has 
increased and that even the most advanced IDSs are unable to cater to the changing demands of the 
security domain. A study [2] performed by Cisco suggests that the data related situation will exacerbate as 
the annual global IP traffic will increase to 2.3 zeta bytes by the year 2020. This will increase the 
challenges in separating useful data from noise, and identifying attack vectors from the datasets. This is 
one of the causes that delay attack detection. It is also the main motivation for this research. In this 
research, we identify volume anomalies (or systemic anomalies), a class of anomaly that has widespread 
consequence. They are beneficial in detecting systemic attacks that result in the failure of an entire system 
as opposed to an individual component. Some of the potential outcomes of a systemic cyber-attack are 
denial of service, significant delay in meeting client requests, and at times cascading effects on the 
supporting backbone infrastructure [37]. Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks have been identified 
as the top threat for any Internet facing entity [20]. In a DDoS, multiple compromised machines attack a 
target and render certain services inaccessible for the legitimate user of those services. We make the 
assumption that the platform itself is trustworthy and initially uncompromised. It is also imperative to 
have a well-defined understanding of the kinds of attacks or threats that the system needs protection 
from. Same detection principle cannot apply to all kinds of attacks. A spear phishing attack targets one 
clearly identified user and has a different attack signature. This is in contrast to a distributed denial of 
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service (DDoS) attack where many compromised systems attack a single target system. An attack 
signature is a unique way of identifying a pattern of information that describes an attempt to exploit a 
system. Specifically, we consider network layer attacks that impact an entire system. These attacks are 
sometimes also referred as systemic attacks. An attacker can launch them through various means, like : 
 
a) malware where a malicious program gets installed on a vulnerable machine and spreads 
throughout the network by infecting other vulnerable machines in close contact,   
b) DDoS by sending incessant network requests to several devices thereby preventing useful 
packets to reach the desired destinations in the network. This attack, called denial-of-service, is 
usually distributed in nature and originates from zombie machines remotely controlled by the 
attacker machine(s), or   
c) steal large amount of data from one or more end nodes, etc. 
 
We propose a novel way for network-wide anomaly detection. It sparsifies overall data collection and 
analyses by accumulating it from the influential nodes in the network. Consequentially, this increases the 
chances of attack detection and in a timely fashion. This approach further reduces computational needs 
for anomaly detection and ultimately decreases analysis time. We also back our theory, through 
simulations and experimentation on network datasets, that it is possible to identify cyber threats from a 
smaller network data, even without compromising the capability of the system to detect attacks. Complex 
systems like communication networks can often be understood by bottom-up analysis. Investigating the 
behavior of individual components and their interconnections can reveal interesting insights into the 
system as a whole. Interactions between components and other entities can be studied using graphs where 
nodes are connected to each other over links known as edges. Data gets transferred between entities over 
these links. We use existing, graph based techniques called centrality measures to identify important 
nodes in the network. These special nodes, also known as central nodes, are important because 
information propagates through them the fastest, the most, or has the maximum reach. In our context, we 
use centrality algorithm that identifies nodes which are central to information propagation in the 
network. To prove our hypothesis of using IC for network-wide anomaly detection, we do the following: 
 
a) Model a simulation based network and analyze its behaviors in the event of system-wide 
anomalies. Earlier work [4] shows that simulation based experimentation is able to explore 
diverse approaches to solving problems in network security. Simulations are able to do this as 
they can manage tradeoffs in a complex system, where conducting real world experiments can be 
difficult or may require a very specific network dataset.  
b) Our approach recommends the process of identifying and usage of specific nodes in a network 
where defenses can be deployed. 
 
Essentially, we examine the impact of identifying central nodes in deploying defenses so that they can 
defend against any kind of network-wide attack. We also answer a few related questions. 
 
a) How does topology factors into effectively identifying these nodes for deploying defense 
mechanisms?  
 b) What role does communication frequency play along with the topology in identifying central 
nodes? 
 
For this, we use a graph-based approach from social network studies which has never been used for this 
purpose to the best of our knowledge. Our key contributions are as follows:   
 
a) Introduce a novel approach for minimizing data for analysis in large networks. To this end, we 
analyze data traversing through the most important nodes in the network, known as central 
nodes; and   
b) Through simulation based experiments, we prove that the time taken to uncover anomalous 
behavior in the network drastically reduces anomaly detection time, when central nodes used for 
analysis. 
 
The remainder of the paper is divided into the following sections: First we cover important concepts used 
in this research. Then, we delve into the main research idea and its implementation details. The 
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simulation environment that is used to demonstrate the implementation is also covered. Finally, we 
discuss the results of the simulation and analyze them. 
 
Literature Study 
 
Large networks send enormous amount of data from one device to another in order to exchange 
information. For this, they select routes that add the least overhead to the network, and yet can be used to 
reliably communicate with other nodes. In these networks, aside from the scale related issues due to 
overwhelming number of devices and their connectivity, understanding the behavior of the network at a 
given time is very challenging and poses a series of obstacles. The success of a network monitor is 
therefore crucially dependent on how timely can it report metrics that are useful in understanding the 
behavior of the network, including any noteworthy changes. These changes can direct the network analyst 
towards points of issues impacting the network and its users. Contemporary network monitors use 
intrusion detection systems, firewalls, network and device event logs, or a combination of these. Besides 
straightforward techniques that measure deviation from the threshold of network measurement 
attributes, there are other statistical techniques that have been successfully deployed. Network-based 
intrusion detection systems (NIDS) protect IT systems and resources from external miscreants that steal 
information, render systems partially or completely inoperable, etc. However, existing N-IDS techniques 
are unable to capture typical network conditions to recognize disruptions, and only rely on fixed 
thresholds to detect those events that cause extreme changes. Such events necessitate continuous 
monitoring and learning the usual routing dynamics and thereafter, deviations in the behavior of the 
network before deciding to investigate an event. Also, with systemic attacks, limited investigation was 
performed as the focus was on the router level of networks. We build on these earlier approaches, but 
considerably extend them by enabling the analysis that benefits a large class of anomaly detection. The 
drawback of tracking these behaviors continuously is the enormous amount of data that they generate. N-
IDS can be broadly classified into two categories:   
 
a) Misuse detection - Signatures created for past malicious behaviors are cataloged for future 
usage.   
b) Anomaly detection, where behavior outside of modeled baseline behavior is flagged and 
appropriate action taken to contain it.  
 
Anomaly Detection  
 
In this section, we provide an overview of the research in this field. Anomaly detection is a well-
researched and a high-impact application that spans across varied research areas and domains [5]. Both 
generic as well as application-specific anomaly detection techniques have been developed over the course 
of past two decades. By definition, anomaly detection refers to finding patterns in data that do not 
conform to expected behavior of the system. It often results in critical, actionable information in a wide 
variety of application domains. For example, if an anomalous traffic pattern is observed in a computer 
network, it could mean that a hacked computer is sending out sensitive data to an unauthorized machine. 
The process of anomaly detection can be summarized by two methods – firstly, what needs to be detected, 
and secondly – how detection takes place. These two phases of identifying intrusion seek distinctive 
information from the collected data. While misuse detection searches for description that matches a 
known malicious behavior, anomaly detection works on the notion of separating normal behavior from 
the rest. This allows anomaly detection to recognize attacks that never been seen before (also known as 
zero-day attacks). 
 
Machine Learning based Anomaly Detection 
 
Before anomaly detection can be applied to a system or dataset, the exact notion of an anomaly needs to 
be understood as it can be different for different application domains. For instance, in healthcare domain 
a small deviation from the normal range of TSH level might be an anomaly, while similar deviation in the 
insurance business might be considered as normal. Thus, anomaly detection cannot be applied using the 
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similar approach among different domains to another, is not straightforward. It actually depends on the 
following criteria:  
 
a) Availability of labeled data for training or validation of models   
b) Ease of distinguishing and separating useful data from noise.  
  
Chandola et. al [5] extensively cover various anomaly detectors as well as the application domain and 
knowledge disciplines they are developed for. In [1], the author suggested that a key requirement for any 
technique to work, one needs a sound understanding of the system. We are of the opinion too that the 
most critical requirement for creating a relevant tool for any environment is to gain deep insights into the 
system and its functioning, capabilities, and limitations. Treating one like a black box and expecting the 
detection tool to work instantly, will lead to erroneous results and very high false-positives. A commonly 
deployed fix is to increase the sensitivity of the tool. But one cannot guarantee this will remain an effective 
strategy over time. Due to these challenges, the anomaly detection problem is not easy to solve. Although, 
machine learning offers a wide range of tools for today’s systems, such as neural networks, support vector 
machines, etc., most of the existing anomaly detection techniques solve a specific formulation of the 
problem. For this research, we propose a graph-based approach which addresses the issue of creating 
customized solutions for each category of anomalous behaviors in a given network. Graphs can be used to 
model a wide variety of structures and relationships, for example networks, and offer commonly used 
terminologies to describe them. Since graphs have the ability to analyze a system from both a top-down 
and a bottom-up approach, they offer ways to formulate problems and also possible approaches to solve 
them. They also provide tools to investigate systems and to study their behavior given a set of certain 
input conditions. A number of research efforts have used graphs analytics result, which are produced by 
network flow records to detect malicious traffic. [38] uses graph cut for intrusion detection [42] is 
designed to detect anomaly when the graph structure changes. The paper [7] is based on commute time, 
which tracks abnormal changes in graph structure and edge weight due change in node relationships. The 
published research in ML based anomaly detection so far has a few shortcomings. Their primary focus is 
not on communication network and it does not appear in their research. Copious research work addresses 
the advantages of sparsifying or condensing graph datasets, but none uses it for anomaly detection. 
 
Graph Analytics based Anomaly Detection  
 
Akoglu et. al [13] extensively cover various outlier detection schemes that are based on graphs. The 
authors recommend graph based anomaly detection for several cases, especially when the ground truth is 
not available or is already marked with anomalies. Graph-based approach is also useful when the data is 
multidimensional and cannot be reduced to fewer ones. In communication networks classification models 
can be trained for link-based spam detection [17]. It takes advantage of features like average degree of 
neighbor, PageRank [19], TrustRank [16], etc. Online spam filtering [18] on social networks is another 
area which uses graph principles like sender’s degree, interaction history, incremental clustering, etc. In 
the field of computer networks, network intrusion uses graph based network feature representations to 
analyze network traffic [15]. This is the closest to which our research is, but varies in the approach and 
overall detection goals. This motivated us into exploring graph-based anomaly detection. The main 
advantages of these methods are:  
 
 a) Network graphs can be explored for their correlations over long periods of time [13],   
b) Graphs are not analyzed in isolation, but in correlation to other entities,   
c) Multi-dimensional characteristics can be analyzed at a singular level as well as in clusters, both 
big and small. 
 
Systemic Attack identification using Anomaly Detection  
 
The focus of our anomaly detector is to defend against systemic attacks such as DDoS. Literature provides 
several detection mechanisms; however, each defense mechanism has been designed to accommodate 
different aspects of the attack problem. We summarize a few of them below:  
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a) Detection point - The attack can be diagnosed either on the network or on the host machines 
like servers, etc. The network detects attacks when the packets route through network junctions, 
such as gateways etc. On the other hand, individual hosts detect potential attacks targeted at 
them. We model only network based attacks.   
b) Detection principle - An attack can be detected either by using an existing attack signatures, a 
network layer congestion pattern, protocol behavior, or host-based activities. Their efficacy lies in 
identifying a certain type of attack pattern. In our simulations, we characterize the detection 
criteria by using an existing machine learning technique, which identifies likelihood of false 
positives and false negatives.   
 
This research focuses on proposing a detection mechanism that can be automatically triggered at network 
nodes in the presence of an on-going network-wide attack. 
 
Centrality measures and Networks  
 
We now we go over the importance of using centrality measures in networks. The concept of centrality 
indices, or just centrality, originally came in late 1940s from studying human communication in small 
groups [7]. Soon centrality gained a strong foothold as an estimate of an individual’s importance in social 
networks [8]. It established relationships between certain features of a network and an actor’s influence. 
In other words, it identified "the most important actor" or "the most useful entity" in a social graph 
(where a vertex is an actor), alibi using ad-hoc formalization. 
 
To understand better, consider a directed acyclic graph (DAG), G(V, E) where V represents the vertices 
and E, the edges connecting them. These vertices represent nodes in a network and the direction of the 
link defines the direction of data flow. This graph is called a network graph and represents the link 
structure of nodes in the network. Since an edge corresponds to a link over which data packets are 
transferred from a node, this embodies the idea that the link contains relevant information. 
Simultaneously, a node plays an important role in transferring this data to its final destination by acting 
as an intermediary. And, the node is able to do that precisely because of its location and connection to the 
destination node. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the structural relevance of a node with respect to 
other nodes in the graph is called the centrality of the node. 
 
With time, many centrality measures were introduced that were motivated by the idea that an individual 
with proximity to others will have more information [9], have more power [11], greater prestige [12], or 
have a greater influence [21] than others. These measures and linkages between actors were used in 
several network analytic studies to evaluate fairly large networks successfully [29], however only for 
application domains like social networks, community organizations, and planning for the most part. 
Despite many useful properties, centrality measures suffer from a major drawback. When not used for the 
appropriate network, or type of network flow, they can often lead to incorrect understanding of results. If 
a centrality index does not relate to the purported index, it becomes difficult to understand the 
measurement. Hence, a clear understanding of the concept of centrality type and its potential for an 
application is very important. In the next section, we summarize the different flow processes based on 
which the choice for centrality measure depends. 
 
Understanding Centralities and Flow Processes  
 
In this section, we cover some of the most widely applied centrality measures in the field of social 
networks. There are different ways of measuring centrality. However, whether a metric is applicable to a 
particular network depends on the two dimensions of typology - the trajectories followed by network 
flows, and spreading mechanism. Network traffic may take the shortest path (geodesic), a path (do not 
repeat nodes or links), a trail (do not repeat links) or a walk (can repeat nodes and links). The method of 
spread can be broadcasting, parallel duplication, serial duplication, or transfer. Data is copied to each 
node with both parallel and serial duplication but not with transfer. In [10], the author shows through 
simulations that these metrics are independent of the underlying graph or network structure. Along the 
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lines of [10], we review some of the well-known centrality measures in order to understand the flow 
assumption they make. 
 
a) Closeness centrality measures for a node, the sum of all graph-theoretic distances from all 
other nodes in a connected graph. Nodes with low scores for closeness centrality will tend to 
receive flows sooner. Here the assumptions are that flows originate from all nodes with equal 
probability, and along the shortest path. Closeness is applicable for situations where traffic travels 
along all routes, like package delivery. And therefore, it can be interpreted as an index of arrival 
time of the traffic. It however allows parallel transfer of information across several routes.   
b) Betweenness centrality counts the number of shortest paths that pass through a node. In 
essence, it measures the total control of a node on the volume of traffic that flows through that 
node. This measure will be applicable for traffic that is transferred from node to node along the 
shortest route, instead of being copied or broadcasted. The traffic has a target and knows the best 
ways to get there. Diseases or gossip do not follow this pattern, as they are copied and not moved. 
They also do not search for a specific target(s), which even if is the case, may not travel along the 
shortest path.   
c) Eigenvector centrality measures whether a node has neighbors who themselves score high on 
centrality. It counts the number of walks of all lengths, weighted inversely by length, which 
emanate from a node. In essence, traffic moves unrestricted along any route, where each node 
follows a parallel duplication process in which it affects all of its neighbors simultaneously. This 
measure is suited well for processes that measure influence.   
d) Degree centrality measures the total number of links incident upon a node. Since it measures a 
kind of flow process that is independent to the typology applicable to closeness, betweenness, and 
eigenvector. It involves only direct links and hence measures the immediate influence. Also, all 
parallel duplication flow processes apply to this measure of centrality. As noted, none of these 
centrality measures are suitable for transferring data in a communication network. The one that 
comes close is the closeness centrality, which does not measure active information transfer along 
the shortest path. If the path exists, it is considered in measuring the centrality. Information 
centrality considers information flow along all paths. Since it is related to closeness (information 
is the reciprocal of path length), it can also be interpreted as an index of arrival time of the traffic. 
This methodology is used to calculate the central nodes in the simulation network.  
e) Information centrality is founded on the axioms of centrality measure - an index based ranking 
system in the field of graph analytics, which orders important nodes from most to least central. 
According to this algorithm, these central nodes have the potential to control information flow in 
the network. 
 
We argue that the behavior of these critical nodes can be tapped to check the pulse of the entire network. 
Since only these specific nodes will be monitored, it automatically reduces the amount of data analyzed, 
computational complexity, and time to detect an anomalous occurrence in the network. Since emphasis is 
on analyzing fewer nodes and lesser associated data, it is a crucial aspect of our research idea. 
 
We demonstrate it by running a simulation based experiment on the network simulation platform, NS2. 
We further evaluate the performance of the algorithm by comparing the time taken to detect anomalies by 
central versus non-central nodes. Our results show that a significant improvement in the time required to 
detect anomalous behavior in a network when central nodes are used. Although, this approach is 
optimized for deployment on controlled nodes with limited energy and memory capacity, it can be 
extended to other networks. We use a simplified network with tractable features to contain the associated 
complexity, and yet understand the impact of our approach. 
 
This work is informed by recent conceptual work that identifies the suitability of centrality indices in 
communication networks [30]. It exhibits a close relationship between flow of current in an electrical 
network and random walks around a graph. We use these results to motivate our search for a centrality 
measure applicable to networks, and ultimately find central nodes to assist in anomaly detection. We 
explore information centrality (IC) as a method to identify central nodes from a given network. It uses the 
location and connectivity of nodes in a given graph and identifies the most accessible ones. The central 
nodes are quicker to respond or to identify any systemic change in the network behavior because of this 
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property. Because of this primary reason, we explore IC to detect anomalous behavior that impacts an 
entire system. 
 
Notations and Definitions 
  
Let G = (V, E) be a connected, directed graph where V denotes the vertex set of size n and E denotes the 
edge set. Two vertices, i and j are considered adjacent if they lie at the two ends of an edge, E (i, j). If there 
is a vertex k in G connecting E(i,j) and E(j,k), then these edges are incident to each other on the vertex j. 
We assign weights to these edges, which is denoted by wi,j. The directed distance d(i,j) between i and j is 
considered to be the length of the directed shortest path from i to j. It is straightforward to realize that 
d(i,j) does not necessarily equals d(j,i), i.e. d(i, j) is not a metric of distance but a pseudo-metric [31]. A 
path is a sequence of vertices (v1,v2,...,vn), where each vertex is connected to the following vertex in the 
sequence. A path from a source vertex i to a destination vertex j is denoted as Pij = (i,i1,i2,...,iz-1,j). 
Clearly, there can be m multiple paths from i to j each denoted by Pij(r), where r = 1,..., m, r ϵ m and is the 
r th path from i to j (in some fixed ordering). Note that Pij (r) and Pij (r+1) are not necessarily disjoint. For 
vertices i,j, the weighted length [22], denoted by len of path Pij (r) is: 
 
 
 
Threat Model  
 
We now describe our formal model comprising the network and related traffic, attacker profile, attack 
characteristics, and detection mechanism. 
 
Network  
 
We model a network of n interconnected units with sensors that accumulate information by observing 
data shared among individual sensing units. Depending upon the placement of these units in the network 
and the traffic pattern, some may prove to be more influential and reliable in the system’s decision-
making process, especially in the presence of noisy data [25]. Accurate identification of these influential 
sensors may prove crucial to understanding the behavior of unusual occurrences in the network. 
Information centrality assigns to each node a quantity that, as we demonstrate in the next section, reflects 
its influence in the network. It identifies the structural elements of the network as well as the 
communication frequency between nodes to derive this number. We abstract this network of n units with 
sensors as a graph G with n vertices in V as defined in section 5. These vertices are connected point-to-
point using private and authenticated channels [23]. There is a central adversary who could either be an 
individual entity or an organization with unbounded computing power, financial, and technological 
resources. 
 
Network Traffic 
  
Body The traffic flow comprises a set of packets that are identified via a given set of traffic features (e.g., 
source and destination IP addresses and ports, and protocol). In this work, in order to study the evolution 
of flow, time is divided into fixed sized intervals. The volume of flow is the number of bytes in the flow 
during the corresponding interval. A flow in a given source node is generated by a discrete-time marked 
point process [26] and is independent of flow properties belonging to other nodes. The traffic is normal 
when the flow process remains the same over time. We also assume that the network links do not get 
saturated even in the presence of high volumes of anomalous traffic. The network behavior is considered 
abnormal when the flow process drastically increases due to an increase in the number of packets or bytes 
in the flow. In our paper, this is as a result of an attack by the adversary. 
 
 
Rastogi 
8Editors: Gurpreet Dhillon and Spyridon Samonas  
Adversary and Attack  
 
In this section, we show how the attack model is justified from the viewpoint of an adversary. We capture 
attacks using standard cryptographic terminology. To actively corrupt a unit, the attacker takes advantage 
of an existing vulnerability in the network units and uses an existing malignant code to exploit it. This 
code allows full control over the infected unit after which it displays arbitrary behavior. The adversary is 
assumed to be static and starts the attack process by corrupting t ϵ V units [27]. The attacker’s eventual 
goal is to disrupt the functioning of the system and render it inaccessible to legitimate users. For this, the 
attacker may implement a distributed denial of service attack using the t nodes and use a broadcasting 
protocol to flood the network with excessive traffic or ping requests. As described in [24], a node v ϵ V can 
be in either of the two possible states infected or safe. At the beginning of the attack protocol, all nodes are 
safe and engaged in normal communication activities with the rest of the network. The attacker starts the 
protocol by infecting t nodes and changing their state from safe to infected. These infected nodes 
communicate with other safe nodes and spread the infection along the path of the network routing 
protocol. Once infected, a node is set to infected state and does not switch back to the safe state. The 
infected nodes behavior is controlled by the malicious code installed on them. The attack propagates 
along the links from any of the t infected nodes to the rest of the safe nodes that communicate with them 
and by replacing the code that exists in safe nodes. The attacker is oblivious to the change of state of 
infected nodes and cannot read the state or the behavior demonstrated by these nodes. The adversary (or 
attacker) actively corrupts networked units. The attacker neither compromises the integrity and 
authenticity of the communication nor reveals any cryptographic secret. The malicious code in every node 
gives more volume to the network by sending a gibberish payload to other units. Concretely, in this 
research we consider only volume related adversarial impact, one that has systemic impact on a network. 
We detect volume anomalies by observing link traffic of a large network. By definition, volume anomalies 
impact a major part of the network and refer to a sudden change in the network traffic [25]. This anomaly 
can originate either from outside or inside the network and is thus observed on most of the links 
traversed. In this work, we only consider internal nodes as the origin of the anomaly. There can be 
multiple causes leading to such anomalies, for example, a distributed denial of service attack causing 
incessant ping requests on a port, or stealing large amount of data from various databases and servers, 
that are also part of the network. 
 
Detection   
 
We deploy a machine learning based anomaly detector and uses it across all nodes in the networks. The 
role of the detector is not to perform a network wide anomaly detection, but to keep track of the 
timestamp when the volume changes across flows. While a volume change does not signify anomalous 
behavior, the machine learning based detector does so on the basis of past information and how the 
detector has been built. In the best case, we achieve the same detection accuracy as the underlying 
detection mechanism. For simplicity, we assume that it is 100% and is left as an open problem for future 
exploration. 
 
Information Centrality-based Anomaly Detector  
 
In this section, we describe the notion of information Centrality (IC) and explain its relation to two 
features of a node - it’s location [9], and frequency of traffic passing through it. To understand IC, we take 
a detour to first understand the motivating concept and introduce some useful related terminologies. 
Information centrality identifies influential or important nodes that are central to information 
propagation in a graph network. The concept of information transmission is originally inspired from 
resistance distance measurement in an electrical circuit [9],[28]. 
 
Now we define the network distance between two vertices, i and j. A fixed electrical resistor is placed on i 
and j with a battery connected across them. For simplicity, we consider resistors of 1 Ohm. The effective 
resistance R is calculated using the Kirchhoff and Ohm laws. However, the resistance distance is not 
calculated simply as the sum of resistances along the path connecting the two vertices. Resistance 
decreases as the number of routes increase. Consequentially, the total resistance, R is the sum of the 
reciprocals of individual paths that connect i and j. 
Exploring Information Centrality for Intrusion Detection in Large Networks 
 
 
 
  
Information Institute Conferences, Las Vegas, NV, April 29- May 1, 2019 9 
Similarly, in a network, if a packet sent from the source node i, individual bytes may traverse through 
several paths to reach destination node j. The time taken by this byte sized information depends on the 
distance of each path. In graph networks, resistance is referred as information measure, a term used to 
denote the total information transferred between a pair of nodes. 
 
Let us demonstrate the concept using an example. We have a graph with seven vertices — i, j, k, l, m, n, 
and o and eight edges — (i,j), (i,k), (m,j), (i,m), (i,l), (l,k), (k,o), and (n,l). The edges are incident. The 
information measure of i, Iij with all other vertices; i.e. i1 ,i2 , ..., Iin. Let’s take the case of vertex i. For the 
pair of vertices i, j, there are three paths, Pij (1) = i-j, Pij (2) = i-k-j, Pij (3) = i-m-n-j. The information 
measure Iij is: 
 
 
If Ii refers to IC of vertex i, then it will be defined as the harmonic average of information associated with 
the path from i to all other nodes. The IC of Iii is defined as infinity. The general formula for information 
centrality for a node i is given below: 
 
 
 
Harmonic mean is chosen over simple average in this case because information measure is given in ratios. 
Harmonic mean transforms all values with different denominators, into those with same ones. It takes 
care of extreme values and thus, gives a more accurate average value that the simple mean [31]. 
 
Discussion on IC  
 
Arguably, information centrality is an approach, which is intuitive and the claims made with respect to 
expected results, predictable. In essence, a simple observation of nodes that handle a lot of traffic tells us 
that they are central to traffic propagation and should be considered influential. Consequentially, they are 
also well positioned to detect anomalies that have a systemic impact on the network. It may appear that 
the work is trivial in its goals and does not warranty further research. And that an analytical model should 
suffice in terms of understanding the applicability of IC for networks. This is indeed the case with the IC 
approach, but partially. There is more to it than meets the eye. The topological and dynamical properties 
of modern communication networks pose challenges making it hard to analyze them in-depth, 
theoretically. Routing schemes further introduce complexities making it hard to establish that 
information centrality is a sound approach for anomaly detection. Consequentially, in this paper, we 
simulate a network that emulates real networks and their traffic patterns. The simulation also preserves 
most of the interesting features previously observed in other research work but is simplistic enough for 
analysis. Our contribution in this research is that information centrality effectively identifies these nodes 
in modern networks and is a good indicator of systemic anomalies, and prove this experimentally in the 
next section. 
 
Experiment  
 
So far, IC has remained under explored in the research community, and it’s applicability and exact usage 
mechanisms have remained vague, especially with respect to communication networks. For the first time, 
we demonstrate the procedure of using IC through simulation-based experiments in a wireless network. 
We follow the theoretical analysis performed in earlier sections to establish the proper usage of IC in a 
large data network. We also demonstrate the role played by node location and frequency of 
communication between node pairs in identifying those that influence information flow. Once central 
nodes have been identified, we validate our hypothesis that they can detect anomalous behavior that 
impacts a network at a systemic level, earlier than non-central nodes. We consider IC measure over other 
centrality measures for two main reasons. Firstly, no other centrality algorithm incorporates 
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communication or data propagation property along with a node’s topological properties. And secondly, it 
was recently proven that IC can be applied to data networks, alibi no work has been done in this direction, 
to the best of our knowledge. In this section, we set the goals for this experiment, the setup environment, 
and the tools used to demonstrate our approach. We the analyze the results in section 9. The goal of this 
experiment is to show that IC-AD can identify central nodes in a wireless network and those nodes can 
inform of an anomalous occurrence in the network early on. We choose the network parameters carefully, 
and keeping in mind the extensibility and inter-operability of protocols and features in a real network 
environment and with other protocols. The experimental setup was run on a 64-bit MacOS enabled 13inch 
MacBook Pro. The processor is a 2.9 GHz Intel Core i7 and the memory is 8GB with 1600MHz DDR3. The 
MacOS was running on the OS X El Capitan, version 10.11.16. We use NS-2 (described in next section) to 
simulate the network, traffic, and apply our approach for anomaly detection. The post simulation trace file 
is analyzed using python and Java code and we use jupyter and eclipse to run these codes, respectively.  
 
Network Simulator-2 (NS-2)  
 
NS-2 is an open source event-driven simulator widely used in the research community to simulate 
communication networks [32]. It is a time-based, discrete event driven simulator. It can be used to 
simulate a wide array of applications that use protocols like TCP, UDP, FTP, and many more. This enables 
NS-2 to model and simulate real networks like wireless sensor networks and the nodes or devices using 
the networks. The simulation code can be written with a lot of precision to demonstrate which event 
happened, at what time, and how. Data transfer between entities can be shown visually using the 
visualization tool called NAM. It is also popular as it can run on various platforms like UNIX, Mac and 
windows platforms and the code is transferrable among platforms. NS-2 can also be used to test security 
of the network by testing different kinds of network attacks like denial of service, hello flood attack, 
sinkhole attacks. 
 
Simulation 
  
We substantiate our hypothesis and simulate a mid-sized ZigBee network. The network comprises 200 
nodes over a mesh topology using ns2[33]. This setup allows us to corroborate our hypothesis in a simple 
environment with tractable networking components and behaviors. At the same time, the simulation 
parameters have been chosen such that there are common features with other popular wireless network 
technologies like Wi-Fi and wlan. IC-AD will work in any environment, so long information is exchanged 
among networking entities. Table 1 summarizes the general simulation parameters. 
 
Table 1: Simulation Parameters 
 
 
 
We simulate a ZigBee network because it is a low cost, low power consuming, and a short-range wireless 
communication technology. Developed for wireless personal area network (WPAN) in early 2000, it is 
widely used in building automation control, and monitoring of IoT. The simulation network has a mesh 
topology as it allows multi-hop peer-to-peer communication, using the AODV routing protocol [39], and 
decentralized routing. The antenna model is omnidirectional, to enable communication from all 
directions.  
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These simulation parameters are chosen keeping in mind their conceptual extensibility into other 
popular, large-scale networks like Wi-Fi and WLAN. This setup allows us to corroborate our hypothesis in 
a simple environment with tractable networking components and behaviors. For example, AODV as a 
routing protocol allows multi-hop packet transfer across the network. 
 
AODV protocol is based on the DSDV proactive algorithm [40]. The idea of DSDV, in turn, was based on 
Bellman Ford shortest path algorithm. It calculates the shortest path in a network, like Dijkstra, but is 
slower that its peer. The reason being, Bell-Ford considers negative weights in a network edge. The AODV 
routing algorithms maintains a routing table to keep track of every node and the closest neighbor hop that 
leads to it. This can also be pictured in a static network where the given node is as the root node and the 
routing table as the minimum spanning tree of the mesh network. Each routing table for a node is also 
periodically updated in case a node goes offline or out of range. This algorithm for AODV can be easily 
shown as an extension of a graph-based routing protocol. It is also extensible to other, more complex 
routing protocols used in wireless and wired networks and hence was the protocol of choice for our 
simulation. 
 
Similarly, a mesh topology is generic and random and does not restrict us from extending this work into 
other topologies. We keep the nodes as static, which prevents routes from changing frequently. However, 
the future work of this research allows some movement in the network nodes.  IC-AD is applied to a 
synthetic data set since the real data sets only provide anecdotal evidence of anomalies. The experiments 
using real datasets are in an initial stage and are not covered in this paper. Also, we do not compare the 
results of IC-AD with another anomaly detection model yet, as the goal is to mainly demonstrate its 
anomaly detection capability in a homogeneous network. We perform experiments to evaluate the 
following characteristics of IC-AD:  
 
a) IC can be used to analyze large networks,   
b) Simulations result in same top central nodes as calculated using IC-AD, and  
  c) Central nodes detect anomalies in the network before non-central nodes.  
 
Creating Ground Truth  
 
This is the training phase where the simulation begins by initializing normal packet transfer across 
different the network using constant bit rate (CBR). The node locations and the source-destination pairs 
in ns-2 are randomly generated using a python script. To simulate the ground truth, we initialize the 
network by transmitting an average traffic load of 0.5 Mbps from various source-destination node pairs. 
This process continues for 80 seconds. At the end of this timeframe, IC-AD is able to categorize central 
nodes and then use them to detect anomalies. The simulation is run 100 times for various combinations of 
source and destination nodes, thereby simulating the flow of data packets in the network and ensuring 
that we get a similar set of nodes as central nodes. The topology remains the same for all the simulations. 
Since IC is calculated based on the flow of information of an entire network, it can also be used for 
identifying anomalous behaviors. We experiment with higher traffic of about 10Mbps and 50Mbps (this is 
high for a ZigBee network) to emulate excessively high average traffic load. Trace files for 900 seconds 
were captured under these traffic rates. This has a systemic impact on the network and is counted as a 
deviation from the normal network behavior. We monitor the performance of all central and non-central 
nodes and keep track of the time when the anomalous behavior is detected w.r.t the anomaly injection 
time. 
 
Classification of Central Nodes  
 
IC-AD calculates the average packet arrival-time for all nodes, both central and non-central in the 
network. By recording the time it takes for a packet to reach a node, we identify nodes that are reachable 
in the shortest time making them central in a network. For analysis, the top 15% (30) and 20% (40) nodes 
ranked in ascending order of average arrival time are selected as central nodes. These are not absolute 
values and are purely used to demonstrate the value of central nodes. 
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Anomaly Detection  
 
We then compare the percentage of central versus non-central nodes that have identified the anomaly 
since introduction into the network. For detecting the abnormal increase in network traffic rate, we use an 
unsupervised machine learning technique called, support vector machine (SVM) as described in [41]. It 
uses feature space for anomaly detection, which is application specific, and hence information needs to be 
captured accordingly. In our experiment, we analyze one dataset comprising of average traffic load. Each 
entry is a sequence of all the possible traffic rates requested by various nodes. In this research, the 
anomaly detector used by the nodes is assumed to be efficient and in this paper, we do not delve deep into 
the error rate of the detection mechanism. 
 
 
Figure 1: Time taken to detect anomaly average traffic load = 10Mbps, central nodes = 15% 
 
 
Figure 2: Time taken to detect anomaly average traffic load = 10Mbps, central nodes = 20% 
 
 
Figure 3: Time taken to detect anomaly average traffic load = 10Mbps, central nodes = 15% 
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Figure 4: Time taken to detect anomaly average traffic load = 10Mbps, central nodes = 20% 
 
Results and Analysis  
 
To evaluate IC-AD, we are interested in two major indicators of performance: the increasing order of 
average arrival time of data for nodes matches that of the order resulting from the information centrality 
algorithm. The graphs in Figures 1,2,3, and 4 show that our calculations are spot on target. The other 
indicator is that for the average traffic payload, the monitoring central nodes can detect the anomalous 
traffic rate much faster than the all other non-central nodes combined. As the anomaly propagates into 
the network the central nodes are able to detect it faster than the rest of the nodes. Monitoring the central 
nodes is a useful implementation in comparison to monitoring the entire network, as 90% or above 
central nodes become aware of the anomaly while only approximately 50%-60% (maximum case) of 
noncentral nodes for the duration of the simulation. We change the anomaly size and also decrease the 
central nodes monitoring the network to further boost our proposition. Results in the charts below show 
that the percentage of central nodes at any given point of time, always surpasses the total percentage of 
noncentral nodes that have detected the anomaly.  
 
Summary  
 
Our main contributions in this research include proving that IC-AD can be used in communication 
networks for identifying central nodes. These central nodes are important and influence the flow of 
information, which makes them extremely valuable. IC-AD identifies these nodes based on their location 
and connectivity to other nodes using a harmonic average of the topological distance between nodes, and 
that central nodes can be used to study important behavioral changes that have a systemic impact on the 
network, such as anomaly detection. In comparison, other IDS use data coming from all the nodes in the 
network. Further, the simulation experiment lent confidence that IC-AD can analyze a network using 
fewer nodes and that property can be extended for anomaly detection. 
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